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When 100% Test Coverage Lies: Contract Faults and the Least-Derived Evidence Principle

A deep dive into why green unit tests can pass while specifications mandate contradictions. Learn the least-derived evidence principle for reliable software contracts.
AUG 25, 2026  ·  4 MIN READ  ·  BY StackScout Engineering

TL;DR: Passing unit tests only prove that an implementation satisfies its written specification—they do not prove the specification is logically sound. When software systems rely on derived labels or rounded floats rather than raw evidence, green test suites can validate contradictory and vulnerable system states across 366 passing test assertions.

Contract testing and least-derived-evidence schema diagram
Figure 1: Contract testing and least-derived-evidence schema diagram.

366 Passing Tests on an Impossible Specification

During a formal audit of an access control engine, our test runner reported 366 passing tests, 0 failures, and 100% branch coverage.

Every single test was green. And the system was completely broken.

The specification stated: A grant is expired if its status enum equals SKIPPED_TTL_EXPIRED. The test suite verified that when the enum was set, the grant was treated as expired.

The bug wasn’t in the implementation. The bug was in the contract: nothing in the system verified whether the grant’s actual expiration timestamp had passed. An agent could set the enum on a grant with 14 days of valid lifetime remaining, and the test suite happily validated the state change.

┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│               Implementation Correctness               │
│       Does the code faithfully execute the spec?       │
│                (Passed: 366 / 366 Tests)               │
└───────────────────────────┬────────────────────────────┘
                            │
                            ▼
┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│               Specification Correctness                │
│       Does the contract accurately model reality?      │
│          ❌ FAILED: Derived Enum Contradicted TTL      │
└────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

The Three Iterations of Flawed System Truth

When building access control and state transition engines, teams make the same three progression mistakes:

1. Free-Text String Matching (Fragile)

Early prototypes check string notes: if "ttl expired" in grant.notes: return False. A single typo or localization change silently disables expiration checks.

2. Typed Enums Without Evidence (Self-Assertion)

Teams “upgrade” strings to Enums (GrantStatus.EXPIRED). But an Enum is just a self-authored claim. Without checking the underlying timestamps, an Enum allows subsystems to assert expired states on active tokens.

3. Rounded Floats & Display Fields (Precision Loss)

Teams compare ttl_remaining_hours <= 0.0. But calculating remaining hours as a float introduces precision artifacts:

The Fix: The Least-Derived Evidence Principle

To prevent specification bugs, state decisions must follow the Least-Derived Evidence Principle: Every authorization decision must be computed directly from raw, immutable timestamps at evaluation time.

┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│            Least-Derived Evidence Architecture         │
│                                                        │
│  [ Current Epoch ms ] ───┐                             │
│                          ├──▶ [ Timestamp Comparator ] │
│  [ Grant Expires Epoch ] ──┘            │              │
│                                         ▼              │
│                                  Boolean Verdict       │
└────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Implementing Ground-Truth Invariant Checks

Never store or trust derived verdict labels in audit logs. Store the raw immutable timestamps so third-party auditors can recompute verdicts deterministically:

import math
from typing import Dict, Any

def verify_grant_active(decision_epoch_ms: int, expires_at_epoch_ms: int) -> Dict[str, Any]:
    """
    Validates grant status strictly using raw integer epoch millisecond timestamps.
    Rejects non-finite values and eliminates float rounding artifacts.
    """
    if not (math.isfinite(decision_epoch_ms) and math.isfinite(expires_at_epoch_ms)):
        raise ValueError("Non-finite timestamp detected in authorization pipeline.")
    
    is_active = decision_epoch_ms < expires_at_epoch_ms
    
    return {
        "is_active": is_active,
        "evidence": {
            "decision_epoch_ms": decision_epoch_ms,
            "expires_at_epoch_ms": expires_at_epoch_ms,
            "delta_ms": expires_at_epoch_ms - decision_epoch_ms
        }
    }

Comparison: Evolution of System Truth Contracts

Contract Version Source of Authority Evaluation Pattern Core Failure Mode Test Result
v1: Free Text Human Note String "ttl expired" in notes Text mutations break logic Green
v2: Typed Enum Enum Field status == EXPIRED Enum contradicts raw TTL Green (366 passing)
v3: Rounded Float Display Float ttl_hours <= 0.0 -0.0 & NaN comparison bugs Green
v4: Least-Derived Raw Epoch Timestamps current_ms < expires_ms None (Deterministic) Mathematically Sound

Common Contract Architecture Mistakes

Frequently Asked Questions

What does “the tests passed, the contract was wrong” mean?

It means the code accurately implemented all written requirements and passed all automated tests, but the underlying specification contained logical errors.

What is the Least-Derived Evidence Principle?

It is the architectural rule that state decisions must be evaluated using the rawest data available rather than cached summaries or derived labels.

Why is trusting enums in state transitions risky?

Enums are self-assertions; without validating the underlying ground truth fields, an enum can assert an expired state on an active entity.

How does floating-point rounding create security vulnerabilities?

Rounding timestamps to two decimal places creates 36-second granularity windows where negative zero (-0.0) can cause expired grants to evaluate as active.

How can engineering teams detect specification defects early?

Teams should conduct adversarial peer reviews, test edge-case inputs (such as NaN and negative zero), and separate contract authorship from code testing.

Conclusion & Key Takeaways

Green tests verify that an implementation respects its specification, but they cannot verify that the specification is correct. By anchoring authorization decisions to least-derived evidence, checking numeric bounds, and submitting contracts to adversarial review, engineering teams can eliminate silent specification flaws before they reach production.